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Case No.
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Amicus Curiae.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
One of the plaintiffs, W. Hughes Brockbank,
isarnember of the Utah State Legislature.

Mr.

Brockbank and his wife, Fawn J. Brockbank, are
partners doing business as Magic Chemical Company.
The company submitted the low bid for the furnishing of janitorial supplies to the State of Utah.

I

The bid was rejected by those authorities responsilile for the procurement of such supplies on the

premise that defendant was subject to a conflict
of interest.

The rejection was made pursuant to

~~ Att'y Gen. Op. No.

1

68-059, Aug. 28, 1968.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
~EMBERS

OF THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE ARE

PROHIBITED FROM BEING INTERESTED,
CAP!1CITY,

IN A PRIVATE

EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,

IN

CONTRACTS TO WHICH THE STATE OF UTAH IS A PARTY.

The position of the defendants in this case
I

~s

been enunciated in Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No.

08-059, Aug. 28, 1968, a copy of which has been

attached to plaintiffs' complaint.

Challenge has

been made by plaintiffs to the above-cited opinion
of the Attorney General as it relates to members
of the Utah State Legislature.

The opinion was

directed at all positions of employment by the
State of Utah.

The present discussion will be

li1t1ited to those principles to which a member of
ihe Utah State Legislature is subject.

2

The plaintiffs have asserted that the pronibitions against public officers being interested
;1n contracts

to which the governmental entity they

se1ve is a party are inapplicable to members of
~c

Utah State Legislature.

The defendants con-

tend that members of the Utah State Legislature
may

not be interested in contracts to which the

State of Utah is a party.

1

(Contrary to the ini-

tial reaction of the plaintiffs, it has never been
argued that legislators are precluded from dealing

with political subdivisions of the State.

The

conclusion was that the prohibition applies only
~those

situations where the contract involves

the State of Utah) •
Basically, the defendants are of the opinion

tnctt section 8, article XIII of the Utah Consti t11tion prohibits legislators from being interested,

3

either directly or indirectly, in contracts to
which the State of Utah is a party.

That pro-

:vision states:

The making of profit out of
public monies, or using the
same for any purpose not authorized by law, by any public officer, shall be deemed
a felony, and shall be punished
as provided by law, but part
of such punishment shall be
disqualification to hold public off ice.
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear that members of the Utah State
Legislature are

11

public officers. 11

Hansen v.

ik9al Services Committee, 19 Utah 2d 229, 429
P.2d 978

(1967) •

Since the constitutional pro-

vision is applicable to "any public officer,

11

the conclusion that legislators fall within its

purview is inescapable.

Once it is determined that legislators are
~iliJect

to the proscription, it becomes necessary
4

wdctermine the nature and the extent of its terms.
At

this point, the plaintiffs assert that article

ixrn, section 8 of the Utah Constitution limits
the activities only of those public officers whose

specific and only duties are to maintain the cus1tody and control over public funds.
l~enerally

They would

limit the application of the provision

I
Ito public treasurers.

Indeed, it cannot be doubted

that public treasurers fall within the ambit of the

.prohibition.

However, the defendants further con-

.tend that included are all public officers who ex-

ercise control over public funds.
That control over given funds is necessary for
~invocation
~~nized

of article XIII, section 8 has been

by this Court.

Utah 2d 371,

Raymond v. Larson, 11

359 P.2d 1048 (1961).

In the Raymond case, the conclusion was drawn
5

t\tat Uw constitutional provision with which we

lie concerned was intended to apply to property
or funds

11

controlled in a fiduciary capacity by

public officials.

11

Thus, it becomes necessary to

ascertain the nature of the position one holds as
a member of a legislative body.

It is universally recognized that, subject
~certain constitutional limitations, a legislature has plenary power over state funds.

E.g.,

Commonwealth v. Ferries Co., 92 S.E. 804 (Va. 1917).
As was stated in Davis v. Moon, 77 Ida. 146, 289
P.2d 614

(1955) :
The legislature has absolute
control over the finances of
the state. The power of the
legislature as to the creation
of indebtedness, or the expenditure of state funds, or making
appropriations, is plenary, except only as limited by the state
Constitution.
6

Having control over state funds as the Leg0l~ure

does, it would seem that the requisites

pronounced in the Raymond case exist.

It is true

thdt the control exercised by the Legislature gen-

erally is not direct control in that contracts and
their attendant expenditures are normally adminis,tered by other state agencies.

But once control

,exists, and particularly where the control is ultimate (with certain exceptions) ,

it is no less ob-

jectionable that it may be indirect control.
The

~aymond

case indicated that the above-

cited constitutional provision applies to public

Officials who control public funds in a "fiduciary
capacity."

It is the contention of the defendants

that members of a legislative body in which the
1tneral public reposes its confidence and trust
ai~i

in a fiduciary capacity, and, therefore, may
7

be
of Utah

-

interested in contracts to which the State
is a party.

s:ate, 142 N.W. 847

In Norbeck

&

Nicholson Co. v.

(S.D. 1913) it was noted that:

A member of the state Legislature, by virtue of his office,
stands in a fiduciary and trust
relation towards the state; in
other words, he is the confidential agent of the state for the
purpose of appropriating the
state's money in payment of the
lawful contractual obligations
of the state, and it seems to
be almost universally held that
it is against sound public policy
to permit such an agent, or any
agent occupying a like position,
to himself be directly or indirectly interested in any contract
with the state • • • during the
period of time of the existence
of such trust and confidential
relationship.
If it is found that a contract involving the

State of Utah is tainted by a conflict of interest,
15

the infirmity removed because of the fact that

t>

contract was negotiated by means of a sealed

·'it

8

hld7

In the absence of a specific statutory or

co11stitutional except ion, a conflict of interest
is not removed by the submission of sealed bids.
ir:fil~ll

I

v. City of Taft, 25 Cal.Rptr. 441, 375

P.2d 289

( 1962) ,

~~in

existence although the public officer

~se

a conflict of interest was held

position was being scrutinized had submitted

the lowest sealed bid.

Similarly, the Utah Supreme

Court in Raymond v. Larson, 11 Utah 2d 371, 359
P.2d 1048

situation.

(1961) was confronted with a sealed bid
The Court found that a conflict of

interest did not exist for the necessary power or
control over the funds in question was nonexistent.
It is apparent that,

if a sealed bid removes the

conflict, the Court need never have considered the
Si 1cstion

of whether there was control over the funds·

If it is determined, then, that a conflict of
9

nterest exists, it is clear that plaintiffs canafforded relief on the basis that their

~ be

nvolvement was according to sealed bid procedures.
Assuming that article XIII, section 8 of the
ltili Constitution does not prohibit contracts con-

1ummated within a framework of a conflict of in~est,

defendants submit that constitutional and

tatutory proscriptions against public officers
1eing interested in contracts to which the govern~~al

entities they serve are a party are but

~larations of the common law,
~'

kt'y

Shasta County v.

90 Cal.App. 519, 265 Pac. 1032 (1928), Utah
Gen. Op. No. 58-048, May 29, 1958, and that

~e common law principles are applicable in the
~vent

the conclusion is reached that article XIII,

~tion 8 of the Utah Constitution does not prohibit

conflicts of interest.
10

The common law prohibition extended to all
~lk

officers, and the defendants have found

.othing indicating that legislators were accorded
rre~rential

treatment.

Thus, assuming the inap-

1licabili ty of existing constitutional and statu-

mcy law, legislators should be precluded from
leing interested in contracts to which the State
1f Utah is a party.
POINT II
PUBLIC POLICY DOES NOT DICTATE A RELAXED IN~ERPRETATION

OF THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES.

The questions with which the Court is faced
In this case, while not simple and not subject to
~~

solution, are less complex and present fewer

~tactical

difficulties than the plaintiffs would

have us believe.
~ation

It has been argued that an appli-

of the conflict of interest doctrine as

11

vterpreted by defendants will disqualify large
~~nts

of our society from possible participa-

ion in government as members of the Utah State
~gislature.

In fact, it appears that 26 of the

Bmembers of the Utah State Senate have some
nvolvement contractually with the State of Utah.
bis, of course, is no excuse.

It is an indict-

A proliferation of the evil does not lessen

~t.

he gravity of the offense.

If it is found that

any would have a conflict of interest if they

cted in the capacity of legislators, the many
~uld be disqualified from so acting.

Apparently, the plaintiffs are arguing that,
6

a matter of policy, the State of Utah cannot

~ord to draw legislative talent from a restricted
klurce.

The defendants submit that the State of

~ah, as a matter of sound public policy, must

12

ecessarily limit possible membership in the Legslaturc.

And upon cursory reflection, it is

vident that an unwarranted disqualification of
unique" legislative talent will not be the result.
f the private,

pecuniary and conflicting interest

fa potential member of the Legislature is rela-

ively small, he need merely di vest himself of his

nterest and avoid the disqualification.
~~her

If, on

hand, the private interest is substan-

ial, a potential legislator will refuse to divest
imself of his interest and he will consequently

e disqualified.
That citizens with conflicting and substan~l pecuniary interests might be precluded from
~ving as legislators does not strike the defend-

hls as a result to be condemned.
PPlFJuded.

13

It should be

Finally, plaintiffs have offered their lack
f inlent to defraud as a factor to be considered.
he defendants have never intimated that the con-

oct of any legislator has been actually motivated
yprospects of personal gain.

The service rendered

othe public by the plaintiff-legislator has been
[the highest caliber and he is to be commended
or such service.

However, actual self-dealing

as never been a prerequisite to an application of
onflict of interest principles.

Such principles

re designed to remove the temptation to sacrifice
he interests of the public for anticipated private

lain, and an absence of self-dealing makes the conlict of interest doctrine no less viable.
~a_y. Woodward,

E.g.,

125 Cal. 119, 57 Pac. 777 (1899).
CONCLUSION

Members of the Utah State Legislature are

14

rohibited from being interested, either directly
cindirectly, in contracts to which the State of
tah is a party.
~Utah

The prohibition is derived from

Constitution and from the common law.

ublic policy does not dictate a relaxation of
~nflict

of interest principles, for the pool from

hich "unique legislative talent" may be drawn will
otbe unduly limited.

Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
ROBERT J. STANSFIELD
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
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